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FUTURE OF FRANCE IN NORTH AFRICA

by

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FUTURE OF FRANCE IN NORTH AFRICA

APPROVAL by the French cabinet, Sept. 12, of a compromise plan for governmental reforms in Morocco ended a tense month of negotiations between the Paris government of Premier Edgar Faure and representatives of French and native interests in the North African protectorate. The negotiations were punctuated, over the week-end of Aug. 20-21, by a savage wave of native outbreaks and French reprisals that extended from Casablanca on the Atlantic coast of Morocco to Constantine near the Mediterranean coast of the neighboring French territory of Algeria. The disorders, which cost the lives of more than 1,000 persons,¹ brought to a head a major political crisis directly involving the future of France in the whole North African littoral and indirectly affecting other countries, including the United States, that are concerned with developments in that area.

UNCERTAIN OUTLOOK FOR LAST-MINUTE REFORMS

Whether the measures agreed to in Paris will end the crisis, or merely mark a breathing spell in restive French North Africa, remains for time to determine. The hope is that the reforms will permit continuing negotiations to establish a representative Moroccan government with a degree of home rule. But the outlook for a lasting political settlement remains uncertain, not only in Morocco but also in Algeria, where native resistance to French rule may prove to be an even more difficult problem in the long run. The manner in which France conducts its dealings with the two territories, moreover, is certain to have an important bearing on future relations with the protectorate of Tunisia, third of the French North African territories, where limited home rule has brought a lessening of tensions.

The plan for Morocco, in broad outline, calls for vacating

¹ Unofficial estimates placed the death toll in the two territories at between 1,000 and 1,700 persons, including Europeans, Arabs, and Berbers.

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of the Moroccan throne by the sultan placed there two years ago by the French, when they ejected his nationalist-minded predecessor; creation of a regency council to guard the throne for the time being; and formation of a widely representative native government with which France will negotiate the terms of a settlement providing greater internal autonomy for the protectorate. As a corollary, the exiled sultan, who has been detained in Madagascar, is to be allowed to move to France though not, at least for the present, to return to Morocco.

Agreement to the foregoing plan still left in question the future attitudes of sharply divided elements in both France and Morocco. Within his own government coalition, Premier Faure faced the difficult task of overcoming the opposition of right-wing parties which, in the past, have blocked concessions to nationalist demands for self-rule. In Morocco many French settlers were unreconciled to reforms which they regarded as an infringement on their own vested rights and interests, and as a surrender of France's historic position in North Africa. Meanwhile, Moroccan nationalists, still in doubt about the terms of a final settlement, were holding out for guarantees that would assure them a continuing voice in a new representative government in the protectorate.

REPERCUSSIONS OF THE MOROCCO-ALGERIA STRIFE

North African unrest and uncertainty are having widespread repercussions in countries not directly affected. Representatives of 15 Arab, Asian, and African countries have asked the United Nations General Assembly to take up the "grave situation" in Morocco and Algeria at the session which begins Sept. 20. In their explanatory memorandum to the U.N. secretariat, the 15 states declared that "for many years the Moroccan people, under French rule, have been deprived of their basic rights of self-determination," and that the unresolved situation there and in Algeria has become "a cause for growing concern."

Wider implications of the North African situation have been underscored by the transfer to Morocco and Algeria of French troops committed to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for the defense of Western Europe. The equivalent of one French division was dispatched last May, and reinforcements rushed to North Africa during the

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bloody August week-end depleted still further the strength of French units committed to N.A.T.O. in Europe.

France was reported at the end of the month to have about ten divisions in North Africa, a deployment that had reduced its N.A.T.O. contingents in Western Europe to three combat divisions. Any additional redeployment would seriously affect the balance of forces established under the European command of the Atlantic alliance. Yet during the August outbreaks responsible French spokesmen suggested that all of France's troops in Europe should be sent to North Africa, if needed to maintain order there. In justification, the chairman of the Defense Committee in the French National Assembly contended that France's principal mission in the alliance should be defense of the western Mediterranean and North Africa.

The Faure government did not go as far as some of its right-wing supporters urged, but on Aug. 23 the premier himself asked for recall of 50,000 to 60,000 reservists as a "precautionary measure" to reinforce North African garrisons and depleted French units in Europe. During the same week the government reportedly notified the European command of N.A.T.O. that another active division would be withdrawn for service in Morocco and Algeria; early in September units of a French division which had been stationed in Germany crossed the Mediterranean to new posts in North Africa.

Other members of the North Atlantic alliance have been worried about the possible effect of the North African situation on the overall balance in Europe and on their own military commitments.² The United States has shown concern also over the use of American military equipment in areas outside the Continent, and over the security of its strategic air bases in North Africa.

The United States generally has maintained a hands-off policy with respect to France's military and political affairs in North Africa. Washington officials disclosed on Aug. 25, however, that France had been advised that this country wished to be informed of any transfers of American military equipment from Europe to the North African territories. Assurances reportedly were forthcoming that no

² The United States is committed to maintain six divisions on the Continent; France's normal commitment is five divisions, now reduced to two.

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heavy American military equipment, such as tanks or heavy artillery, had been sent across the Mediterranean.³

American air bases in Morocco have given the United States a direct interest and a concurrent stake in the political stability of that area. Four strategic air bases have been completed since 1951, in addition to a naval base at Port Lyautey.⁴ U.S. military personnel, and some 7,000 dependents living outside the bases, were not molested during the recent disturbances. As the base agreements were negotiated with France, the protecting power, any major change in the legal status of France in Morocco might affect the position of this country vis-a-vis a future independent Moroccan government. Hence the United States has been at pains to remain on good terms with both the French and the native Moroccans.

NATIONALIST CHALLENGE TO POSITION OF FRANCE

France's dominant position in the Mediterranean littoral has been challenged by the rising tide of nationalism that has spread rapidly in the last few years across all of its North African territories—Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco. Each of these territories has been rent by acts of violence and terrorism, aggravated by economic and political inequalities between a ruling French minority and an awakening native majority, and complicated by racial, religious, or dynastic rivalries. In each territory successive French governments have vacillated between a policy of stern repression and a program of limited concessions to satisfy native demands for self-rule.

In Tunisia, smallest and most homogeneous of the three dependencies, France has reversed its earlier repressive policies and attempted to collaborate with responsible nationalist leaders to achieve a working partnership under limited home rule. Negotiations initiated by former Premier Mendes-France in July 1954 were continued this year by the Faure government. A series of agreements, concluded in June, gave Tunisia responsibility for managing its own internal affairs, while leaving France responsible for the country's defense and foreign relations.⁵

³ France had announced in June that American helicopters were being purchased for use in Algeria; however, U.S. officials denied published charges that the helicopters were being used by France "to kill Algerian rebels."

⁴ The United States Air Force bases are located at Nouasseur, Sidi Slimane, Ben Guerir, and Boulhaut, all in western French Morocco.

⁵ The Tunisian accord, ratified by the French National Assembly in July, went into effect on Aug. 31.

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In Algeria, nominally a part of metropolitan France and largest of the three North African territories, French armed forces have been trying to suppress a nationalist-led insurrection that has raged in the Aures mountains for more than ten months. Since the revolt broke out in November 1954, the French parliament has twice given the government emergency powers to combat nationalist terrorism, and has authorized heavy troop reinforcements in an effort to crush resistance.⁶ While rejecting all demands for autonomy, the Faure government has moved cautiously toward economic and political reforms designed to remove causes of unrest by equalizing conditions among native and European populations.

In Morocco, where nationalist pressure for revision of the protectorate relationship established in 1912 has been mounting since the end of World War II, French indecision compounded the problems that have had to be faced in resolving the current crisis. A succession of coalition governments in Paris alternated between repression and conciliation, either acting too late to prevent violence or postponing decisions until reasonable compromise became difficult or impossible.

DIVISION OF COUNSELS WITHIN FRENCH GOVERNMENT

Each of the last three French governments has been sharply split on North African policy, with the extreme right wing demanding firmness in dealing with nationalist agitation and the center and left wing counseling moderation. The right-of-center Laniel government promised reforms in Morocco in 1953, but local French authorities in the protectorate refused to have any dealings with the dominant nationalist party, Istiqlal, whose leaders had been outlawed, but whose demands for Moroccan autonomy had won sympathetic support from the then sultan, Sidi Mohammed ben Youssef. The sultan was deposed in August of that year and replaced by an aged relative, Sidi Mohammed ben Moulay Arafa, who was immediately denounced by Moroccan nationalists as a French puppet and usurper.

In 1954 the left-of-center Mendes-France government, attempting to make a program of home rule for Tunisia a pattern for similar reforms in Morocco, held out a prospect of direct negotiations with all sections of Moroccan opinion,

⁶ On July 30 the National Assembly extended the "state of emergency" in Algeria for another nine months—to April 1956.

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including the nationalists. But while Mendes-France won support in the National Assembly for his policy in Tunisia, he failed to make headway with the program for Morocco. On Feb. 5, 1955, the Mendes-France ministry was defeated, 319 to 273, on a vote of confidence that lined up right-wing extremists, Communists, and dissident conservatives against the government.

The succeeding Faure government, a coalition of all center and right-wing parties with an almost unprecedented total of 421 seats in the National Assembly,⁷ attempted to pursue a course of moderation not dissimilar from that initiated by Mendes-France. During the Tunisian negotiations, Faure managed to hold his majority together without much difficulty; but from the outset of the Moroccan talks the premier faced stiff opposition from the same conservative elements that had defeated the earlier government. At several critical stages in the Moroccan negotiations, Faure was reportedly confronted with threats of resignation by members of his own cabinet.

Foreign Minister Pinay, leader of the conservative Independent Peasants, and Defense Minister Koenig, a former dissident Gaullist, supported Premier Faure's compromise program on Sept. 12; but, earlier, leading members of their own parties had joined three other groups in opposing any negotiations with Moroccans who had been "directly or indirectly responsible" for the August riots. In a telegram to the premier on Aug. 23, when Faure was negotiating with Moroccan representatives in Aix-les-Bains, members of five right-wing parties declared that "Any concessions made to those who desire to remove France from Morocco can only aggravate the situation."

Although Faure continued to resist pressure from the right-wing factions, he was forced to replace the French resident general in Morocco, Gilbert Grandval, whose recommendations formed the basis of the "reconciliation" program.

⁷ Only the Socialists, Progressives, and Communists (with a combined strength of 205 seats) are outside the coalition.

Northwest Africa Under Rule of France

NORTHWEST AFRICA, comprising the contiguous territories of Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco, is a vast oblong-shaped area bordered on the north by the Mediterranean Sea, on the west by the Atlantic Ocean, and on the south and east by the Sahara and Libyan deserts. The region as a whole has been described as "a block of highlands hemmed in by the seas and the sands." The Atlas mountain system forms two parallel ranges, one near the Mediterranean coast and one inland, which descend gradually from the rugged highlands of Morocco eastward to the Aures mountains of Algeria and the gentle slopes of Tunisia. Between the two ranges and along a narrow coastal belt lie fertile lands which have been invaded over the centuries by many different peoples: Phoenicians, Romans, Vandals, Arabs, and Turks.

The native population of the region includes some 18 million Berbers and Arabs, who embrace the Moslem faith, and about 500,000 Jews, most of whom have ancient roots in the land. The oldest ethnic group is composed of the Berbers, a Mediterranean people of obscure origin, primarily Caucasian, who have inhabited the area since ancient times. The Arab influx began in the seventh century and continued through the 14th century, bringing the Islamic religion and introducing Arabic customs and language.

Berbers and Arabs have intermingled and intermarried for more than a thousand years, making it difficult to distinguish racially between the two groups. In isolated districts of Morocco and Algeria Berber tribes have retained their language and identity; in the cities many Berbers now speak and read Arabic (there is no written Berber language), and the urban population generally has become "Arabized" in language, way of life, and culture.

ORIGINS OF FRENCH INFLUENCE AND CONTROL

French political influence in North Africa dates back only to the 19th century. Algeria was occupied in 1830 after a French military expedition had seized the city of Algiers for the ostensible purpose of avenging an insult to the French consul. Tunisia became a French protectorate in 1881. Morocco assumed the status of a protectorate in 1912.

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The relationship between France and Algeria always has differed from that between France and the two protectorates.⁸ Algeria, formerly under the loose control of the Turkish empire, was annexed to France, extensively colonized by French settlers, and eventually incorporated (except for the southern desert regions) into metropolitan France. Tunisia and Morocco, on the other hand, were not annexed outright; they were linked with France by protectorate treaties concluded with native rulers, who retained nominal sovereignty under French supervision of foreign affairs and internal security.

The protectorate relationships were established by the treaties of Bardo (1881) and La Marsa (1883) with Tunisia, and the Treaty of Fez (1912) with Morocco. In the Tunisian agreements the ruling Bey of Tunis authorized the French to occupy any region of the country they thought necessary, to conduct Tunisia's foreign relations, and to undertake such "administrative, judicial, and financial reforms" as France considered useful. Similarly, in the Treaty of Fez the Sultan of Morocco agreed to institute "a new regime which will bring about the administrative, judicial, educational, financial, and military reforms which the French government shall consider necessary" in Morocco.

In both Tunisia and Morocco a French resident general, appointed by the Paris government, controlled the native administration and the conduct of foreign affairs. However, France specifically undertook in the Fez treaty to respect existing religious institutions in Morocco and to uphold the traditional prestige of the sultan. That pledge was observed by the first resident general, Marshal Lyautey, who retained much of the formal structure of the native government while superimposing a French administration. But later residents general, in both Morocco and Tunisia, were less scrupulous in protecting native rights and institutions when they came into conflict with the interests of a growing French community which enjoyed a privileged position.

French rule has brought about far-reaching social and economic changes in all of the North African territories: The total native population has doubled since 1920 under improved public health conditions; railways, roads, and air-

⁸ For early history of French relations with the three territories, see "Nationalism in North Africa," *E.R.R.*, Vol. I 1952, pp. 150-156.

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ports have been built; modern harbors and seaports have been developed; hydroelectric plants and irrigation works have been constructed with French capital. In the course of these developments, however, political and economic power remained concentrated in the hands of a French minority in each of the three territories.

Today there are about 1,650,000 European settlers, mostly French, in North Africa. The largest group is in Algeria, where about a million Frenchmen constitute 12 per cent of the population. In Morocco, there are about 350,000 French *colons* in a total population of more than eight million. In Tunisia the French colony numbers only about 170,000 in a country of 3,400,000 Arabs, Berbers, and Jews. The French contend that their public improvements have benefited the entire population and raised the general standard of living, but native nationalist leaders assert that the chief beneficiaries have been members of the entrenched French minority.

Although France has made a number of concessions to nationalist demands, the government's difficulties admittedly have been increased by strong resistance from French settlers to even moderate reforms. Not only have the French *colons* exercised a powerful influence over French residents general in Morocco and Tunisia, and French administrators in Algeria, but they have exerted direct influence also on successive Paris governments through close ties with right-wing political factions and important commercial interests in France.

POSTWAR CHANGES IN FRENCH ADMINISTRATION

French postwar policy in North Africa has been carried out, in theory, within the framework of the French constitution of 1946, which established the new concept of the French Union in place of the old French Empire. As conceived by the framers of the constitution, the French Union was to provide a point of departure for evolving new relationships between France and three kinds of overseas territories: (1) Overseas departments, like the three into which northern Algeria is divided, administered as an integral part of metropolitan France; (2) associated states, like Indo-China, enjoying home rule but linked with France; (3) colonies and trusteeship territories, administered by France in preparation for the time when they would be eligible for either assimilation or home rule.

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In practice, French postwar governments have failed not only to satisfy nationalist aspirations in the dependent territories, but also to make it clear (even to many Frenchmen) whether the primary goal is assimilation or home rule. Actually, both goals have been pursued simultaneously, with reforms in Algeria pointed toward full assimilation and changes in the protectorates of Tunisia and Morocco directed toward increasing autonomy or home rule. Neither course has fully satisfied the native nationalists or the French colonists.

Tunisia and Morocco have not become members of the French Union, although France continues to hope that both territories will eventually have the status of associated states within the union. Since the loss of Indo-China, however, France has found little encouragement in North Africa to nourish that hope. And the rules for association in the French Union remain so rigid that even the most autonomous territory cannot attain the degree of independence enjoyed by members of the British Commonwealth.

In Algeria the process of assimilation has been carried forward under the organic statute of 1947, which gave all Algerian inhabitants the rights of French citizenship and established an Algerian Assembly with increased powers. But the promise of equal rights was not fully implemented in practice; compromise legislation failed to satisfy nationalist aspirations on the one hand or French expectations on the other.

OBSTACLES TO FRENCH ASSIMILATION OF ALGERIA

Under the 1947 statute Algeria has 30 representatives in the French National Assembly at Paris, 14 in the Council of the Republic, and 18 in the Assembly of the French Union. The seats are divided equally between representatives chosen by two Algerian electoral colleges, one of which is predominantly French and the other predominantly Moslem.⁹

The organic statute provided also for increased native representation in a new Algerian Assembly of 120 members, half of whom are elected by each of the two electoral colleges. Legislative powers of the Assembly are limited, however, and executive authority remains in the hands of

⁹ All inhabitants of French origin, and some Moslems who meet certain civil requirements, are entitled to vote in the first electoral college; all other Moslems vote in the second electoral college.

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a governor general appointed by and responsible to the French government. As the representative of the French Republic, the governor general has direct authority over most of the administrative departments and may approve or reject legislation (including the Algerian budget) approved by the Assembly.

The present governor general, Jacques Soustelle, has submitted a draft plan for further administrative reorganization of Algeria on lines designed to help remove causes of native unrest and nationalist agitation. The plan, tentatively approved by the Faure government in June, calls for redistribution of land to afford wider opportunities to Moslem farmers, equalization of economic opportunities between Europeans and Moslems, and other social reforms. But the demand of Algerian nationalists for full autonomy remains unfulfilled.

Past French policy in Algeria was severely criticized, and the gravity of native unrest there sharply emphasized, in a report last June by a four-party subcommittee of the French National Assembly. The report, based on first-hand observations, reviewed errors of economic and social policy which, it said, had favored Europeans at the expense of the native population and thus prepared the ground for revolt. While the report estimated rebel forces in open revolt against the government at only about 2,500, it stressed the fact that the insurrection had gained the moral support of Moslem elements both inside and outside of Algeria.

The French deputies made various observations about future policy in Algeria. They warned that France should not misapprehend the reality of the revolt, which, while not a war in the fullest sense of the word, involved more than a tribal uprising calling for police action. They insisted that much more should be done to equalize conditions between Moslems and French settlers; that an effective policy to win the sympathies of the Moslems should have equal priority with police and military action against the rebels.

After the uprisings of Aug. 20 the Faure cabinet was under increasingly heavy pressure from conservative parties within the Paris coalition, and from the French community in Algeria, to give first priority to military measures to suppress the revolt. The government arranged for immediate reinforcement of French troops in both Algeria and

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Morocco and delayed action on most of the social reforms, recommended by the governor general, which it had tentatively approved in June. Meanwhile, French residents in Algeria, fearing that concessions would be taken by nationalist leaders as a sign of weakness, continued to oppose even such moderate reforms as the release of Moslem mosques from state control.¹⁰

Outside the government coalition, a few voices challenged the whole concept of assimilation as applied to Algeria. Guy Mollet, secretary general of the French Socialist Party, declared on Sept. 6 that "The opportunity to make Frenchmen out of the colonial peoples is gone." The alternative, he said, was to work out a new form of association such as that achieved in the recent negotiations with Tunisia. But that alternative has found little support among leaders of other political parties, apparently because in French eyes Algeria is "a part of France" and hence not subject to the same rules that govern relations with the protectorates and other overseas territories.

RECENT ADVANCES TOWARD HOME RULE IN TUNISIA

The new form of association between France and Tunisia, under which that protectorate has gained internal autonomy, was worked out in a series of six conventions and annexed protocols signed at Paris on June 3, 1955, and promulgated on Aug. 31. Nine months of hard negotiation, initiated by Mendes-France and concluded by the Faure government, went into the drafting of the conventions. Despite protests by extremists on both sides, the accords were acclaimed by moderate Frenchmen of all political parties and by moderate nationalist leaders in all of the North African territories.

Under the terms of the conventions, France undertook to give Tunisia internal autonomy, including the right to organize its own government with responsibility for managing the country's internal affairs. Specifically, France renounced the right to intervene in the administrative, judicial, and financial affairs of the Tunisian government.¹¹ On

¹⁰ Moslems have long sought the right to select their own religious personnel, such as the khatibs (preachers) and imams (who lead the faithful in prayer). The Soustelle plan recommended that the French administration abandon its present practice of appointing such religious functionaries, but the change was opposed by the local French community.

¹¹ Art. 1 of the Convention of La Marsa (1883) under which France was authorized to intervene in internal administration was rescinded by Art. 2 of the new general convention.

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the other hand, Tunisia agreed to maintain and develop close cooperation with France, which continues to be responsible for foreign affairs and national defense. Tunisia undertook also to guarantee French and foreign residents in the country against discrimination and to protect the rights of French civil service employees.¹²

French powers and responsibilities are to be transferred within agreed time limits. The French resident general was replaced on Sept. 13 by a High Commissioner who will act as intermediary between the French government and the Tunisian authorities. French directors who formerly headed departments of the Tunisian government (finance, public works, education, etc.) are to be replaced soon by Tunisian ministers. The new Tunisian government will have a free hand from the outset in managing its finances, its national budget, and its educational system.

Certain other powers that have been exercised by France are to be transferred gradually to Tunisian control. Thus French control over urban and rural police is to be turned over during a ten-year period.¹³ The jurisdictional powers of French courts are to be transferred to mixed Franco-Tunisian courts within time limits of five to 15 years; before the expiration of 20 years, a mixed commission will determine whether Tunisian courts should assume full jurisdiction over all cases arising under the regime of internal autonomy.¹⁴

The Tunisian accords were approved by overwhelming majorities in the French parliament¹⁵ and won strong support from nationalist leaders in Tunisia. The successful outcome of the negotiations was attributed, in large measure, to the conciliatory attitude of moderate leaders on both sides. During the negotiations the Faure government released Habib Bourguiba, leader of the Neo Destour (Constitution) Party, who had been exiled in 1952. Support of the new agreements by Bourguiba, chief spokesman of Tunisian nationalism, seemed to promise continued cooperation of the responsible nationalist groups.

¹² Both parties agreed to continue the provisions of the Treaty of Bardo, reinterpreted as a "treaty of friendship and assistance" within the framework of which they would maintain a relationship of mutual trust and cooperation.

¹³ In certain large cities French police commissioners may be retained for as long as 20 years.

¹⁴ French courts are to retain jurisdiction only over cases involving national defense or security, as defined under the Treaty of Bardo.

¹⁵ By a vote of 538 to 44 in the French National Assembly (July 8) and by a vote of 254 to 25 in the Council of the Republic (Aug. 3).

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DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEW PROGRAM FOR MOROCCO

Shortly after signing the agreement with Tunisia in June, the Faure government announced plans to carry out a similar program of governmental reform in Morocco. Faure told the National Assembly on June 21 that his government proposed to develop "modern political institutions" in Morocco that would preserve France's position under the Treaty of Fez, while permitting gradual transfer of internal authority from French to Moroccan hands. France, he said, would never agree to renounce *la Présence Française*, but would seek to preserve the "presence of France" under new relationships.

To carry out the program, Faure appointed a new resident general, Gilbert Grandval, who for ten years had been French High Commissioner and chief of the French diplomatic mission in the Saar. Grandval's instructions were to bring together all elements of Moroccan opinion, including the French community, the traditionally pro-French Berber factions, and representatives of Moroccan nationalist parties, to discuss the basic principles of an agreement that might be acceptable to all parties.

Grandval's first reports to Paris gave forewarning of serious trouble. Tensions in Morocco, he said, were close to the breaking point; not only was there dissension between the native population and the French community, but both elements were sharply divided among themselves. Although moderate nationalist leaders were prepared to negotiate with moderate Frenchmen, extremists on both sides were inciting acts of violence and terrorism that already had taken a heavy toll of life. Grandval's arrival in Morocco had precipitated a new round of terrorism.¹⁶

A major source of dissension was the unresolved issue of the sultan, the spiritual and nominally temporal ruler of Morocco. That issue had its roots in the deposition of the pro-nationalist Mohammed ben Youssef, in August 1953, and his replacement by the aged Mohammed ben Moulay Arafa, who was reviled by Moroccan nationalists and most Moslems as a usurper and French puppet.¹⁷ Ben Youssef,

¹⁶ Well over a hundred lives were lost in riots and reprisals during July and early August, before the major outbreaks of Aug. 20.

¹⁷ The French government at the time asserted that ben Youssef was forced out by an uprising of Berber tribesmen, led by Thami el Glaoui, pasha of Marrakesh; it is now generally conceded that the French resident general (Gen. Augustine Guillaume) inspired and approved the removal, either with or without direct authority from Paris.

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in exile in Madagascar, had become the symbol of Moroccan nationalism, and removal of ben Moulay Arafa was the first condition demanded by nationalist leaders for a reform program in the protectorate.

Early in August Grandval sent Premier Faure his recommendations for resolving the crisis. His formula had three parts: (1) Removal of Sultan ben Moulay Arafa, either by obtaining his voluntary resignation or by action of the central government council, called the *Maghzen*; ¹⁸ (2) appointment of a council of guardians of the throne for a period not to exceed two years, pending the naming of a successor; (3) formation of a representative Moroccan government composed of all major parties, including the nationalists, with whom France would negotiate terms for internal autonomy. Grandval warned Paris that serious disorders could be expected on Aug. 20—the second anniversary of ben Youssef's deposition—unless negotiations were started at once.

The Faure government eventually approved the main features of Grandval's formula, but not until after Grandval himself had been forced to resign, and not until after the disturbances he foresaw had complicated the search for a compromise settlement. On Aug. 22, two days after the bloody uprisings in Morocco, a five-man cabinet committee headed by Faure met at Aix-les-Bains for the long-delayed talks with representative Moroccan leaders. Participating in the conversations were spokesmen for the French community in Morocco; representatives of the Berber pashas and caids (tribal chiefs) headed by the pasha of Marrakesh, Thami el Glaoui, who had led the move to oust ben Youssef; and leaders of the two nationalist parties, the dominant *Istiqlal* and the less radical Democratic Party of Independence.

Results of the week-long talks and subsequent cabinet meetings in Paris were disclosed, piecemeal, in a series of official communiqués and conflicting unofficial announcements. Grandval's resignation, announced Aug. 31, was followed the same day by the appointment as his successor of Gen. Pierre Boyer de Latour, former French resident general in Tunisia, who had played a major role in the home-rule negotiations with that protectorate. According

¹⁸ The *Maghzen* is headed by the Grand Vizier, nominally chosen by the sultan and responsible to him; it includes native ministers, or viziers, who constitute a kind of cabinet under French supervision.

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to government spokesmen in Paris, the plan which Boyer de Latour was expected to carry out called for prompt implementation of the three steps previously recommended by Grandval, bolstered by an agreement with the nationalists that the former sultan, ben Youssef, would be "invited" to approve the program and be free to leave his exile in Madagascar to take up residence in France.

Ben Youssef, consulted by emissaries from Paris and Morocco, reportedly gave his blessing to the scheme. Ben Moulay Arafa, after refusing to resign under pressure, seemed ready to step down if agreement could be reached on a regency council and a representative government capable of restoring peace to Morocco. But whether the plan could be carried out depended, in the last analysis, on the ability of moderates on both sides to control their own extremists.

The Faure government faced continuing opposition from its right wing, which had forced the resignation of Grandval as the price of accepting the premier's reform program. Moderate elements in the French Moroccan community still faced the hostility of extremists who refused to have any dealings with the nationalists. And the nationalist parties themselves were divided in their aims and objectives.

Nationalist Movement in North Africa

THE NATIONALIST movement in Morocco, as in all of France's North African dependencies, has built up strength and prestige rapidly since the end of World War II. The movement as a whole has gained thousands of new recruits in the cities and has made headway in the tribal districts. Its leadership nevertheless has been divided with respect to both immediate aims and the best methods of achieving ultimate objectives.

Of the two organized nationalist groups in Morocco, the Istiqlal Party is admittedly the stronger and more widely representative. It was organized in 1944 by a group of intellectuals, who broke away from the older reform movement composed of relatively prosperous native businessmen, with the avowed aim of pressing by democratic means for Moroccan independence. Its leaders included men who

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were themselves products of French culture as well as Moslem training and traditions: lawyers like Bouabib; young teachers like Ben-Barka, and professional men like Ahmed Belafrej, secretary of the party. But as Istiqlal broadened its political base after the war, it took in labor leaders like Majoub Seddick and other advocates of direct action.

Istiqlal members were represented in the Moroccan government council before 1951; but when the party was outlawed in 1953, its leaders were arrested, driven underground, or forced to flee to foreign countries. Allal el Fassi, the party's exiled head, has been living in Cairo; Belafrej has been in Madrid.¹⁹ Despite French repression, the moderates have continued to control Istiqlal policy, although their authority has been threatened by extremists. While still proclaiming complete independence as their ultimate goal, the moderates have been ready to negotiate for limited home rule under a representative government.

The Democratic Party of Independence, second nationalist group in Morocco, is composed largely of middle-class Moslems drawn from the large cities; it has only a small following in rural areas. In the past few years it has generally supported Istiqlal policies. Both groups have demanded direct representation in any government set up under a regency council.

In Tunisia the nationalist movement has been dominated by the well organized Neo-Destour Party, under the moderate leadership of Bourguiba. Although Bourguiba regards home rule as no more than a step toward ultimate Tunisian independence, he has pledged to support the new accords with France. Elections for a constituent assembly are to be held this year. A small left-wing faction of Neo-Destour, headed by Salah ben Youssef, has opposed the agreements with France and is continuing to press for full independence.

In Algeria two nationalist parties have been represented in the Assembly since the establishment of that body under the 1947 statute. One, called the Triumph of Democratic Liberties, led by Messali Hadji, advocates complete independence; the other, known as the Democratic Union of the Algerian Manifesto, led by Ferhat Abbas, has demanded

¹⁹ Neither of these leaders took part directly in the talks at Aix-les-Bains, although they were consulted by Istiqlal representatives who included Bouabib and Ben-Barka.

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internal autonomy within the French Union. The Algerian Communist Party, which supported the August insurrection, was outlawed in consequence on Sept. 13.

ARAB-ASIAN ACTIVITY IN SUPPORT OF NATIONALISTS

The nationalist movement in North Africa has received strong political and moral support from all of the Arab countries in Africa and the Middle East, and from other Asian nations as well. Egypt, in particular, has long been a center of Arab nationalist propaganda, and France has charged that extremist groups in Cairo have furnished arms and funds to support insurrectionary movements in the French North African territories. In the United Nations the so-called Arab-Asian bloc has offered numerous resolutions to condemn French policy in North Africa and support the "legitimate aspirations" of the peoples there.

An active propaganda campaign has been conducted from Cairo by the North African Liberation Committee, an agency supported by the major nationalist groups in all three French territories. Organized in 1946 as a center to coordinate information activities of the movement, the Cairo committee has become the headquarters for many prominent nationalist exiles. Working with the committee at the present time are Allal el Fassi of Morocco, Salah ben Youssef of Tunisia, and the exiled Algerian nationalist leader, Mohammed Khider. The group broadcasts radio programs in Arabic beamed at Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, but its leaders deny that they have provided arms or financial support to insurrectionary factions.

For the past three years Arab, Asian, and African states have requested that "the Morocco question" and "the Tunisia question" be included on the agenda of the U.N. General Assembly, and each year the matter has been debated at length. French representatives, while defending the position of France in the Assembly debates, have declined to participate in committee meetings at which the resolutions were discussed.

The General Assembly last year adopted a resolution that took note of the negotiations then proceeding between France and Tunisia but postponed further consideration of the question in the hope that the talks would result in a "satisfactory solution" in conformity with the U.N. Charter. A similar resolution was adopted with respect to Morocco.